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ABSTRACT 
 
This research examine the effect of goodwill impairment on earnings management. The 
change of standard stated that goodwill is no longer subject to amortization but 
impairment test raised a good chance for management to give their discretion over 
goodwill impairment. In this research, I estimate that goodwill impairment positively 
affects earnings management measured using discretionary accruals with board size, 
leverage, operating cash flows, and political cost as control variables. The model used 
for measuring discretionary accruals is Modified Jones model. By the total sample of 47 
firms in Indonesia from 2011-2013, I found that goodwill impairment positively affects 
earnings management measured using discretionary accruals. 
 
 
Keywords: earnings management, discretionary accruals, goodwill impairment 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  2 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Currently, International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) convergence process 
which officially started in 2008 has entered the second phase to completely implement 
IFRS to Indonesian Generally Accepted Accounting Principles called Pernyataan 
Standar Akuntansi Keuangan (PSAK), which will take place from 2013 to 2015. The 
convergence process is done as the commitment of Indonesia in the G-20 agreement. 
The results of G-20 meeting in Washington DC on November 15, 2008 that was 
declared as follows: (1) Strengthening Transparency and Accountability; (2) Enhancing 
Sound Regulation; (3) Promoting Integrity in Financial Markets; (4) Reinforcing 
International Cooperation; and (5) Reforming International Financial 
Institutions(Zamzami, 2011).  
For the reporting entity, the most important point of G-20 agreement is to 
strengthening transparency and accountability. IFRS are principle-based accounting 
standards that are designed to cover the weaknesses of the old accounting standards, 
such as the recording of off-balance sheet or the use of extraordinary items. Besides, it 
is also expected to enhance global comparability of financial information which are 
derived from countries. Hence, IFRS have high levels of implementation which is much 
broader and include practices in various entities; since the principle is much more 
fundamental and flexible when compared with the rule-based standards that are more 
detailed and inflexible. Thus, it enables the use of professional judgment making 
financial statements to give better reflection on the substance of transaction and 
economic conditions. Since the judgment may contains various perspective, it is quite 
important in determining the professional judgment with the basis of logical reasoning 
and reasonable. 
Back in 2004, the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) revised 
International Accounting Standard (IAS) 36 - Impairment of assets, IAS 38 – Intangible 
assets and introduced International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 3 – Business 
Combinations. This standards altered the Indonesian accounting standards for PSAK 48 
(Revision 2009) – Impairment of assets, PSAK 19 – Intangible assets and PSAK 22 
(2010) – Business Combination. These will be the basis form to the accounting 
procedure goodwill in Indonesia. Therefore, listed companies in Indonesia are required 
to use PSAK 48 (Revision 2009), PSAK 19 and PSAK 22 (2010) to recognize and 
evaluate goodwill. 
In the new adjustment of PSAK 22 (2010), goodwill is no longer amortized but is 
subject to an annual impairment test. The purpose of the new standard IAS 36 is to 
prohibit the method of goodwill amortization that leads to arbitrary accounting (IFRS 
2008, BC 140). By using the impairment method, it is possible for a company‟s 
management to process several assumptions in the impairment test. It is therefore 
interesting to examine whether this treatment leads to better accounting of goodwill, 
based on relevance and timeliness of accounting information. 
PSAK 22 (2010) stipulates that the company should record a loss due to 
impairment if the recoverable amount is smaller than the carrying amount. The amount 
of the impairment loss can be determined by performing an impairment test every year. 
According to the standards, then the amortization expense is not reported in the 
financial statements. Impairment test is considered in giving better reflection of the 
transaction‟ substance and the economic condition so that the information presented not 
mislead the users of financial statements in making decisions. Therefore, goodwill does 
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not necessarily decline in value on a routine basis but rather has an indeterminate life; 
led to the conclusion in PSAK 22 (2010) that goodwill should not be amortized but 
instead must be tested at least annually for impairment. 
The impairment for goodwill is set in PSAK 48 (Revision 2009) in accordance with 
IAS 36 – Impairment of assets. Specifically, PSAK 48 (Revision 2009) is designed to 
ensure that assets are carried at no more than their recoverable amount and to define 
how the recoverable amount is calculated. The steps to do impairment test needs high 
degree of management estimation especially when determining the Cash Generating 
Unit (CGU) allocated to goodwill, amount of goodwill allocated and the amount of 
recoverable amount. Recoverable amount is used as a comparison between fair value 
less cost to sell or value in use. The difficulty in determining the fair value of CGU as a 
goodwill allocation makes the management typically uses the value in use to determine 
the recoverable amount of the CGU. 
Determination of the recoverable amount will depend on management's estimation. 
If the recoverable amount of goodwill is less than the carrying amount, the carrying 
amount of the goodwill is reduced by the recoverable amount. Impairment losses will be 
reported as an expense in the income statement and will reduce the amount of goodwill 
reported in the statement of financial position; impairment of goodwill cannot be 
recovered. PSAK 48 (Revision 2009) seems to give management flexibility to exercise 
their judgment in determining and reporting goodwill impairment losses – which is very 
subjective. The determination of amount in impairment test that require management's 
estimation may become the accounting choice for management. This accounting choice 
of writing down the value of goodwill and the magnitude of impairment loss provides a 
good chance for managers to opportunistically manage the reported earnings.  
 
1.2 Research Question 
The adoption of IAS 36 through PSAK 48 for Impairment of Assets produce some 
changes in the treatment of goodwill in Indonesia. The previous standard needs to 
amortize the goodwill but now it becomes the subject of impairment test. The steps to 
do impairment test is very subjective and depending to the managements‟ estimation 
which need professional judgment. This judgment will be used to set the cash 
generating unit when impairment test is done. The flexibility of the managements to 
record goodwill impairment loss and to written-off the goodwill regarding their own 
estimation will raise high possibility of earnings management.  
Based on Alves (2013), she investigates whether Portuguese listed companies use 
goodwill impairment loss to manage earnings. Using a sample of 33 Euro next Lisbon 
non-financial firms over a period of 6 years, from 2005 through 2010, she found that 
goodwill impairment is significantly positive related to earnings management using 
discretionary accruals as the measurement to detect it. It supports the idea that IAS 36 
provides managers with discretion for goodwill write-off. Moreover, the results also 
reveal that there is less earnings management when the board size is large and when 
cash flows are high and that there is more earnings management when leverage and 
political costs are high. 
In Indonesia, researches regarding goodwill impairment and earnings management 
has been done through Dewi K (2014) and Walangitan (2011) using Return on Assets 
and Return On Sales as the measurement. There is still no research using discretionary 
accruals as the proxy to detect earnings management. Based on Laili et al. (2014) 
measurement tools such as Jones (1991) model, a modified Jones model used In 
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Dechow et al. (1995), or regression analysis will provide more solid evidence about 
utilizing goodwill impairment for earning management. Moreover, goodwill impairment 
is using high level of management discretions. 
This research will replicate Alves (2013) which will investigates whether listed 
companies in Indonesia use goodwill impairment to manage earnings using 
discretionary accruals as the measurement with board size, leverage, political cost, and 
operating cash flow as the control variables. This control variables are taken from Alves 
(2013) as the consideration that goodwill impairment is not the sole factor which 
affecting earnings management.  
Based on the explanation, thereby, this research will raise questions: 
Does goodwill impairment positively affect earnings management measured using 
discretionary accruals? 
 
1.3 Research Objectives 
This research has an objective to prove that empirically goodwill impairment 
positively affects earnings management measured using discretionary accruals. 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEWS AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 Goodwill 
According to IAS 38, an intangible asset is an identifiable non-monetary asset 
without physical substance. Intangible assets could be generated from the entities‟ 
activity. From IAS 38, it is stated that: 
“Entities frequently expend resources, or incur liabilities, on the acquisition, 
development, maintenance or enhancement of intangible resources such as scientific or 
technical knowledge, design and implementation of new processes or systems, licenses, 
intellectual property, market knowledge and trademarks (including brand names and 
publishing titles). Common examples of items encompassed by these broad headings are 
computer software, patents, copyrights, motion picture films, customer lists, mortgage 
servicing rights, fishing licenses, import quotas, franchises, customer or supplier 
relationships, customer loyalty, market share and marketing rights.” 
Indonesian PSAK 10 (Revision 2010) as in accordance with IFRS 3 Business 
Combinations is stating that if an intangible asset is acquired in a business combination, 
the cost of that intangible asset is its fair value at the acquisition date. If an asset 
acquired in a business combination is separable or arises from contractual or other legal 
rights, sufficient information exists to measure reliably the fair value of the asset. In 
accordance with this IFRS 3 (as revised in 2008), an acquirer recognizes at the 
acquisition date, separately from goodwill, an intangible asset of the acquiree, 
irrespective of whether the asset had been recognized by the acquiree before the 
business combination. This means that the acquirer recognizes as an asset separately 
from goodwill an in-process research and development project of the acquiree if the 
project meets the definition of an intangible asset. 
Thus, it is clearly stated that goodwill is one of the example of intangible assets. In 
paragraph 11, it is stated that: 
“The definition of an intangible asset requires an intangible asset to be identifiable 
to distinguish it from goodwill. Goodwill recognized in a business combination is an 
asset representing the future economic benefits arising from other assets acquired in a 
business combination that are not individually identified and separately recognized. The 
future economic benefits may result from synergy between the identifiable assets 
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acquired or from assets that, individually, do not qualify for recognition in the financial 
statements.” 
Thus in brief, goodwill as an intangible asset is an identifiable non-monetary asset 
without physical substance which has future economic benefit and should be controlled. 
Goodwill is the difference between the cost of the purchase and the fair value of the net 
assets and it could arise in two different ways: (1) internally generated or; (2) acquired 
as part of the acquisition of another company (business combination). Goodwill shows 
up in the financial statements only if an acquisition has occurred. Internally generated 
goodwill is not recognized.  
In Indonesia, the treatment for goodwill has been shifted from amortization to 
annual impairment test. Before 2011, accounting for goodwill was regulated by PSAK 
48 requiring that goodwill arising from acquisition to be recognized and amortized on a 
systematic basis over its useful life. 
 
2.1.1 Accounting for Goodwill 
Goodwill is an intangible asset and falls under the regulation of IAS 38. Paragraph 
89 describes that accounting for an intangible assets is based on its useful life. It makes 
a distinction between intangible assets with a finite or indefinite life (IFRS 2008, par 
89). This difference is important for the method of measurement of intangible assets. 
The lifetime for goodwill is difficult to reliably predict, and would be treated as an asset 
with an indefinite useful lifetime. Following paragraphs 107 and 108, IAS 36 
Impairment of Assets is then used to apply the impairment method, as the amortization 
of goodwill is explicitly prohibited (IFRS 2008).  
The objective of IAS 36 Impairment of assets is to describe an impairment test. The 
Standard prescribes the procedures that an entity applies to ensure that its assets are 
carried at no more than their recoverable amount. An asset is carried at more than its 
recoverable amount if its carrying amount exceeds the amount to be recovered through 
the use or sale the assets. An entity has to test their intangible assets if there is an 
indication for an impairment loss. As an extension paragraph 10b explicitly describes, 
testing goodwill annually is required, regardless whether there is in indication for 
impairment (IFRS 2008, par. 10b). 
The new measurement to treat goodwill by FASB in SFAS 142 aims to: 
1) Provide a better assessment of goodwill in the statement of financial position, 
2) Eliminate the amortization of the arbitrary treatment, 
3) Provide a better understanding to users of financial statements regarding the 
performance of the acquired company, thus it gives a better the ability to predict the 
company's earnings and cash flows in the future. 
 
Standar Akuntansi Keuangan 22 paragraph 66 concerning goodwill acquired before 
January 1, 2011 states that: 
“Entities applying this statement prospectively for goodwill acquired in the 
business combination acquisition date prior to 1 January 2011. Therefore, entities 
should: 
a. discontinue the amortization of goodwill from the beginning of the period of the 
financial year beginning on or after January 1, 2011; 
b. eliminate the carrying amount of the related accumulated amortization in respect 
of goodwill at the beginning of a period of decline in the fiscal year beginning 
on or after January 1, 2011; and 
 
 
 
 
  6 
 
c. performed an impairment test of goodwill in accordance with PSAK 48 
(Revision 2009): Impairment of Assets since the early period of the financial 
year beginning on or after 1 January 2011.” 
 
According to PSAK 48 (Revision 2009), Goodwill is not the subject of 
amortization but it has to be tested for impairment annually. Impairment is the condition 
that exists when the carrying amount of goodwill exceeds its implied fair value. 
Goodwill should be tested for impairment at a level of reporting as a reporting unit – in 
this case is called Cash Generating Unit (CGU). 
 
2.1.1.1 Amortization  
Based on SFAC 6 paragraph 142, amortization is the accounting process of 
reducing an amount by periodic payments or write-downs. Specifically, amortization is 
the process of reducing a liability recorded as a result of a cash receipt by recognizing 
revenues or reducing an asset recorded as a result of a cash payment by recognizing 
expenses or costs of production. That is, amortization is an allocation process for 
accounting for prepayments and deferrals. Under the purchase method, the excess of the 
acquisition cost over the fair values of the identifiable net assets acquired at the date of 
acquisition is recognized as goodwill. 
According to PSAK 22 (1994) paragraph 39 explains that goodwill has to be 
amortized as an expense over its useful life. Goodwill amortization periods of 5 years 
can be extended up to 20 years with appropriate base. The amortization used straight-
line method unless there is better method with certain provisions. In 2011, this standard 
is no longer relevant because the new PSAK 22 (2010) requires goodwill has to be 
tested for impairment and cannot be amortized. 
 
2.1.1.2 Impairment 
In order to fulfil PSAK 22 (2010) which requires goodwill as subject to impairment 
test, accounting procedure for goodwill arises from acquisition is set on PSAK 48 
(2009). According to PSAK 48 (2009) paragraphs 80-81, goodwill acquired at the 
acquisition date in a business combination should be directly allocated to each of the 
acquirer‟s cash-generating units, or groups of cash generating units, that is expected to 
benefit from the synergies of the combination, irrespective of whether other assets or 
liabilities of the acquiree are assigned to those units or groups of units. Goodwill 
allocation to CGU is done as the consideration that goodwill does not generate cash 
flows independently. It defines CGU as the smallest identifiable group of assets that 
generates cash inflows that are largely independent of the cash inflows from other assets 
or group of assets. Each unit or group of units to which the goodwill is so allocated 
should represent the lowest level within the entity at which the goodwill is monitored 
for internal management purposes; and not be larger than an operating segment as 
defined by PSAK 5 – Operating Segments. 
Cash-generating units that have been allocated goodwill must be tested for 
impairment on an annual basis. The test is performed by comparing the carrying amount 
of the unit (excluding goodwill) with its recoverable amount. If the recoverable amount 
exceeds the carrying amount of the unit, then goodwill allocated should not be 
considered for impairment. Impairment of goodwill should be recognized if the carrying 
amount of the unit exceeds the recoverable amount.  
 
 
 
 
  7 
 
The recoverable amount is the comparison between the net fair values of the value 
in use. The net fair value is the fair value less costs to sell, the amount that can be 
obtained from the sale of an asset or CGU between parties in a fair transaction less costs 
of disposal (such as whether fair value was determined by reference to an active 
market). If recoverable amount is value in use, the discount rates used in the current 
estimate and previous estimate (if any) of value in use. The second way can be seen 
from the cash flow projections of the testing point to the end of use of the asset in the 
future; it is taking into the present value for the level of risk, both inflation risk and 
capital risk. 
If the recoverable amount of an individual asset cannot be determined, an 
impairment loss is recognized for the asset if its carrying amount is greater than the fair 
value less costs to sell and the results of the allocation procedures; and no impairment 
loss is recognized for the asset if the related cash-generating unit is not impaired. This 
applies even if the asset‟s fair value less costs to sell is less than its carrying amount. 
The impairment of goodwill should be done with reduce the carrying amount of any 
goodwill allocated to the CGU.  
An entity should disclose the requirements of their impairment test. Not only the 
impairment described in the financial report, but also the event that led to the 
impairment, information on the calculation of both method and the class of assets to 
which the impairment is related in the case of CGUs is information that companies have 
to disclose.  
 
2.1.1.3 Differences between Goodwill Amortization and Goodwill Impairment 
The changes of goodwill accounting procedures indeed have some differences. 
Table 2.1 shows the differences between the previous and current standard. PSAK 22 
1994 set for goodwill amortization while the current PSAK 22 2010 sets that goodwill 
should be tested for impairment.  
The differences regarding the periods, the amount, and how it is done will be 
written on the table below: 
Table 2.1 
Differences between Goodwill Amortization and Goodwill Impairment 
  Amortization Impairment 
Standard 
PSAK 22 1994 PSAK 22 2010 
PSAK 19 PSAK 48 
Useful 
life 
5 years can be exceeded up 
to 20 years with justification 
indefinite life 
When 
Annually; it has to be 
amortized. 
It does not necessary to have 
impairment loss for each year; 
but the test of impairment is 
mandatory each year. 
Amount Same amount for each year 
Different amount based on 
carrying amount compare to its 
recoverable amount 
How  
 
Compare carrying amount and 
recoverable amount 
 
recoverable amount: 
1. value in use or 
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2. fair value - cost to sell 
 
Impairment = recoverable 
amount < carrying amount 
 
2.2 Earnings Management 
With IFRS, the financial statements prepared is on the accrual basis accounting. 
Accrual accounting has the advantage that the company's earnings information and 
measurement generally give a better indication of economic performance rather than the 
information generated from the cash basis accounting (FASB 1978). Accrual accounting 
also has its weaknesses. Some criticizes that the policies of accrual accounting were not 
perfect and obscure the financial report which is aiming to provide information about 
cash flow and the capability of the company to generate cash. The obscurity happen due 
to accrual accounting policies which give some choices to the reporting entity. Hence, it 
is very obvious that it will raise vulnerability of information. This vulnerability is called 
earnings management. 
According to Chen (2010), Earnings management is said to be a “reasonable and 
legal management decision making and reporting, intended to achieve and disclose 
stable and predictable financial results”. Most people are aware of the fact that 
companies‟ earnings are their “net income” or “net profit”. A company‟s earning is 
believed to be the most important item in the financial statements. It is something that 
the most analysts use when analyzing a company‟s performance and prospective 
potential. The most important, the expected value of a company‟s share price is the 
present value of all its future earnings, and therefore the value of a company is closely 
related to the increase or decrease in the earnings. Scott (2006: 344) defines earnings 
management as choices of the accounting policies applied by the manager which is 
naturally exist to maximize their utility and/or the market value of the company.  
Earnings management is a topic of interest, both for accounting researchers and 
practitioners. The phenomenon of earnings management has also enliven the business 
world and the press coverage. Some systematic empirical evidence has shown the 
existence of this phenomenon of earnings management, including Gu & Lee (1999), De 
Angelo (1988), Holthausen & Sloan (1995), and others. In particular, Gu & Lee (1999) 
have shown that earnings management has been expanded and there is in every financial 
report submitted by the company. They give a proof that earnings management occurs 
in every quarterly financial statements, and management level are largest profit in the 
third quarter. This shows that earnings management practices is a common 
phenomenon, not only in certain events but it has been so deeply rooted in the business. 
Scott (2006) divides the way to understand earnings management into two. First, 
see it as opportunistic behavior of managers to maximize their utility for compensation 
contract, contract debts, and political costs (opportunistic earnings management). 
Second, from the perspective of efficient contracting (efficient earnings management), 
in which earnings management gives managers a flexibility to protect the parties 
involved in the contract as anticipation of unexpected events. Thus, managers can 
influence the company‟s stock market value through profit management, for example by 
making the income smoothing. 
Based on Roychowdury et al. (2015) they stated that earnings management can 
occur through two channels, which are: 
1. Accruals Management (AM) 
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Accruals-based earnings management involves managers‟ intervention in the 
financial reporting process via the exercise of their discretion and judgment regarding 
accounting choices. (Roychowdhury, 2006). Thus, accrual-based earnings management 
generally used for detecting earnings management regarding to accounting choices and 
policies. Using accrual based earnings management techniques to meet analysts‟ 
forecasts in the United States has been well researched. Accruals are the difference 
between net income and cash flows. For example, when companies sell items to others 
on credit during a growth period, the sale creates an accrual of revenue.  
When companies engage in earnings management, they can increase or decrease 
income by creating accruals; these are often referred to as non-discretionary accruals. 
However, it is the discretionary accruals, accruals created to manipulate changes in 
reported earnings that are of concern. These types of accruals include using increasing 
or decreasing estimates of bad debt reserves, warranty costs, and inventory write-
downs. (Moore et al., 2009) 
Such research requires a model that estimates the discretionary components of 
reported income. Existing models range from simple models in which discretionary 
accruals are measured as total accruals, to more sophisticated models that attempt to 
separate total accruals into discretionary and nondiscretionary components. Many of the 
non-discretionary accruals estimate the model from the company's past accruals level 
prior to the period when there is no systematic earnings management (Jones, 1991). The 
other alternative is using cross sectional approach where the level of the company's 
normal accrual in an accrual period compared with the comparison companies in the 
same period (Defond & Jiambavlo, 1992). By the research; either time series or cross-
sectional face the issue with the accrual occurs will vary according to changes in 
business conditions.  
From the past research in their attempt to study accruals use two models: Healy 
(1985) and DeAngelo (1986) use total accruals as a proxy for earnings management 
while Jones (1991), Dechow, et al. (1995), Yoon & Miller (2006) use discretionary 
accruals as a measure of earnings management. Later, they found that modified Jones 
model is the most powerful model to detect earnings management. 
2. Real Activity Management (RAM).  
Earnings management through real activity can be detected through operating cash 
flows, discretionary costs, and production costs. Research on the earnings management 
through real activities concentrate on the investment activities such as research and 
development spending reductions. Roychowdury (2006) provide evidence that the 
manager manipulation through real activity by giving rebates to increase sales, reduce 
cost of goods sold through an increase in inventories, and reduced discretionary 
expenses to increase reported earnings. Real activities manipulation can assume many 
forms, including under-investment in research and development (R&D), advertising, 
and employee training, all for the purpose of meeting short-term goals. Marketing 
strategies, tactics, and budgets are often at the center of implementing real activity-
based earnings management as well. 
Roychowdury (2006) says that the earnings management through real activities 
manipulation is the shift from the profit management practices into normal operation 
abnormal operating practices, motivated by the desire managers to deceive some 
stakeholders in order to believe the financial statements are prepared on the basis of 
normal operation. Displacement of normal operating practice is not normal to not 
contribute to the value of the company despite reporting managers achieve goals. 
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Managers involved profit management concerned with personal gain to achieve the 
objectives of reporting because they act as an agent. For example, earnings management 
to avoid losses, and avoid debt covenant violations, to avoid government intervention, 
as well as to increase the bonus. 
In Indonesia, the research on the manipulation of real activity has been carried out 
by Andayani (2008). The result is a manufacturing company doing overproduction, 
discounts, credits and allowances as an indication of earnings management, which led to 
high production costs. 
  
2.3 Hypothesis Development 
The current standard for goodwill requires that the amount of goodwill needs to be 
tested annually to determine whether any changes in value have occurred. PSAK 48 
(Revision 2009) as the convergence of IAS 36 contains the specific requirement that 
goodwill is subject to a mandatory annual test of impairment and should be impaired to 
fair value, if necessary. The purpose of the new standard IAS 36 is to prohibit the 
method of goodwill amortization that leads to arbitrary accounting. By using the 
impairment method, it is possible for a company‟s management to process several 
assumptions in the impairment test. Evaluation of fair value and assessment of 
impairment of goodwill requires management judgment which in fact, can bring a 
higher of subjectivity in the valuation of goodwill. So, even though an annual 
impairment test is mandatory, the actual recognition of a goodwill impairment loss is 
still subject to management„s discretion and highly subjective. 
Goodwill impairment losses will affect the accruals, because they lower the 
reported earnings while they have no influence on the cash flows from operations. 
Therefore, accounting for goodwill impairment loss provides chances for earnings 
management. Given that recoverable values are not readily available for many cash 
generating unit (CGU) to which goodwill balances were assigned, managers enjoy a 
certain amount of discretion when applying the impairment test.  
It is hard and challenging to detect or measure earnings management. It is not 
possible to observe earnings management directly. Therefore, previous researchers have 
investigated two venues for earnings management, the choice of accounting methods 
and the management of accruals. Past research in their attempt to study accruals use two 
models: Healy (1985) and DeAngelo (1986) use total accruals as a proxy for earnings 
management while Jones (1991), Dechow et al. (1995), Yoon & Miller (2006) use 
discretionary accruals as a measure of earnings management. The possible explanation 
to exclude non-discretionary accruals is that since non-discretionary accruals are used to 
reflect business condition; subject to firms condition and sales growth and thus it cannot 
be controlled by managers, it is excluded from the studies.  
The most popular discretionary model is the standard Jones (1991) model. This 
model is able to decompose accruals into discretionary and non-discretionary accruals. 
When changes in sales are adjusted for the change in receivables, standard Jones model 
becomes a modified Jones model, which is proposed by Dechow et al. (1995). The 
modified model is designed to reduce the measurement error of discretionary accruals 
when discretion is applied over sale. The study by Dechow et al. (1995) finds that a 
modified Jones model provides the most powerful test of earnings management 
compared to Healy DeAngelo and standard Jones and industry model. Moreover, 
previous studies (Alves, 2013) suggest that determining earnings management using 
discretionary accruals gave better result. The suggestion comes up with the 
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discretionary accruals model developed by Jones (1991) which is very famous and used 
to many research. The modified Jones model developed by Dechow et al. (1995) 
represent the current discretionary accrual by adding one more item which is 
receivables. (Patro & Pattanayak, 2014) 
 Alves (2013) suggested to include control variables as goodwill impairment is not 
the only factor to managed earnings. The control variables which are significant will be 
used in this research, there are board size, leverage, operating cash flow and political 
cost. Therefore, it is predicted that goodwill impairment will affect earnings 
management using discretionary accruals as the measurement. Therefore the hypothesis 
developed: 
Ha: Goodwill impairment positively affects earnings management 
measured using discretionary accruals with board size, leverage, operating cash 
flows and political cost as the control variables. 
 
III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Population and Sample 
The sample selection is based on purposive sampling method with the following 
criteria: 
1. The company is listed on Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) for 2011-2013. 
2. The companies are not in financial and banking sector due to the differential 
method in estimating the discretionary accruals. 
3. The company must have shares listed in the previous period and did not 
experience any delisting in 2011-2013. 
4. The company publishes audited financial statements 2011-2013 
5. The financial statements used are the consolidated financial statements. 
6. The company's goodwill impairment is included in the statement of financial 
position during the periods. 
7. The financial statements presented in rupiah.  
8. The variables are available in the financial statements (no missing information) 
Based on the sample criteria, here is the sample selection from year 2011 up to 
2013: 
Table 3.1  
Sample Selection 
No Criteria 2011 2012 2013 TOTAL 
1 
Companies listed in IDX and publish 
financial statement 
519 450 459 1,428 
2 
Companies in  financial and banking 
industry 
-110 -85 -76 -271 
3 
Companies which do not have goodwill 
impairment 
-384 -348 -360 -1,092 
4 
Companies are not listed on previous 
period 
-1 0 0 -1 
5 
Companies have currency other than 
Rupiah 
-3 -2 -3 -8 
6 
The company has no complete data for 
variables 
-5 -2 0 -9 
  TOTAL 14 13 20 47 
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As it shows on Table 3.1, the total companies is 1,428 and exclusion of financial 
and banking industry for 271 companies. The companies which do not have goodwill 
impairment is 1,092 resulting the rest of 65 companies. The final sample of 47 
companies is provided after we exclude unlisted company in the previous period, 
companies with non-Rupiah currency and companies with missing information.  
 
3.2 Variables Definition and Measurement 
3.2.1 Goodwill Impairment 
Goodwill Impairment (GW_Impair) is the independent variable. The determination 
of the amount will affect the management‟s discretionary accruals. It measured as the 
reported goodwill impairment amount for firm “i” in year “t” deflated by the total 
assets, formulated from the previous research by Alves (2013) as below: 
 
Explanation: 
Goodwill impairment: 
1. Input directly from financial statement or 
2. -  
 
3.2.2 Earnings Management 
Earnings management is the dependent variable. Following the previous research, 
this study will use discretionary accruals as a proxy for determining earnings 
management. This research will simplified the previous study which used cross 
sectional variation of the Jones and modified Jones model by Dechow, Sloan and 
Sweeney (1995). The Jones‟ model consists of regressing total accruals (TACC) on two 
variables: the change in revenues (ΔRev), which models the normal component of 
working capital accruals; and the level of gross property, plant and equipment (PPE), 
included to control for the non-discretionary component of depreciation and 
amortization expense, the main component of long-term accruals. Both variables and 
the intercept are divided by lagged total assets in order to avoid problems of 
heteroscedasticity. 
The modified Jones model differs from the original Jones model in that the change 
in revenues is adjusted for the change in receivables (ΔRec). Non-discretionary 
accruals (NDACC_ModJones) are the predictions from the OLS estimation of modified 
model as follows: 
- -
-
- -
 (1) 
While the estimated discretionary accruals (DACC_ModJones) are the residuals. 
The modified Jones model is as follows: 
-
-
-
-
- -
  (2) 
Where: 
TACC = total accounting accruals at the end of year t, estimated as earnings before tax 
minus net cash flows from operations 
TA   = total assets at the beginning of year t. 
∆Rev  = change in revenues of year t and t-1 
∆Rec  = change in accounts receivable of year t and t-1 
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PPE    = gross property, plant and equipment at the end of year t 
i,t   = firm and year index. 
   = error term 
DACC = the estimated discretionary part of total accruals for firm i at time t. 
 
 
 
3.2.3 Control Variables 
The control variables will be measured as follows: 
1. Board size (Bsizeit) 
Based on Alves (2013) the measurement use to board size (Bsizeit) is the total 
number of commissioner board members. Alves (2013) find that larger boards are 
associated with lower levels of discretionary accruals. 
Bsizeit = ∑ number of the commissioner board memberit 
2. Leverage (Levit)  
When leverage concerns with debt covenant violation, it is calculated using the 
company's ratio of debt to equity. This ratio explains that a company with a high debt to 
equity ratio shows the greater composition of total debt compared with their total 
equities; depict that the companies rely the financial on creditors and they usually 
manage earnings to avoid the violation.  
Based on Alves (2013), leverage is significantly positive, providing evidence that 
an increase in leverage encourage managers to use more accruals to manage earnings to 
avoid debt covenant violation. This variable will be measured as follow: 
 
 
3. Operating cash flows (CFsit) 
The measurement of this control variable will follow the previous research by 
Alves (2013) which is ratio between the operating cash flows and the total assets of firm 
i for period t-1. Alves (2013) find that operating cash flows are negatively associated 
with discretionary accruals, suggesting that firms with strong operating cash flows are 
less likely to use discretionary accruals to engage in earnings management. This 
variable will be measured as follow: 
 
4. Political cost (Sizeit) 
Political cost or size can be measured by its total assets, total sales, or market 
capitalization. In this research, it will measured using the results of the logarithm of 
total assets. Total assets used as a measurement for firm size with the consideration that 
total assets relatively more stable compared to total sales or market capitalization as it is 
stated in Wuryatiningsih (2002).  Alves (2013) found that large firms have a higher 
level of earnings management.The measurement will be: 
Sizeit  = LN(TotalAssets) 
 
3.3 Research Model 
This study uses the OLS regression model to assessing the association between 
goodwill impairment and discretionary accruals. 
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Where: 
DACCit = discretionary accruals of firm i for period t by using proxy for earnings 
management the modified Jones model. 
GW_Impairit = is measure as the reported goodwill impairment amount for firm in “i” 
year “i” deflated by the total asset. 
Bsizeit  = number of members on the commisioner board of firm i for period t. 
Levit  = ratio between the book value of all liabilities and the total assets of 
firm i for period t. 
Cash flowsit = ratio between the operating cash flows and the total assets of firm i for 
period t-1. 
Sizeit  = logarithm of total assets of firm i for period t. 
it  = residual term of firm i for period t. 
is a constant, are the coefficients. 
 
IV. DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics show the pictures and describe the data from its mean, 
standard deviation, maximum, and minimum. Descriptive statistics explain about all of 
the variables which are used in the research and shows the comparison among those 
variables. It also can help in detecting the outlier data. The result of the data analysis 
shows that GW_Impair variable represents on average 12.4% of the total assets of the 
company with the minimum value of 0% up to 17%. Bsize is comprised by 
approximately 5 members. The range of member is not too high because it only exist 
from 2 up to 10 members in board. Lev variables represents on average 1.9530 of the 
total assets of the company. Cash flows variable represents on average 13.38% of the 
total assets by the company. 
 
4.2 Normality Test 
Normality test is used to ascertain whether the data is normally distributed or not. 
This is very important to have a normal data which the residuals is unbiased and 
independent. In this study, the normality test is done by looking at the residual values in 
the regression model. This method is Kolmogorov-Smirnov test with 5% significant 
value. The indication of normally distributed data can be observed from the value of 
unstandardized residual of Asymp. Sig (2-tailed). In the condition where unstandardized 
residual of Asymp. Sig (2-tailed) is more than significance of 0.05 (5%), it is concluded 
that the data is normally distributed. The outcome in table 4.2 shows the value of 0.918, 
where 0.918 > 0.05, in conclusion, the sample data is normally distributed. 
 
4.3 Multicollinearity tests 
Multicollinearity test is done to observe the correlation among independent 
variables in the regression model. The good one is shown when there are no association 
among the independent variables (free/no multicollinearity). Multicollinearity is done 
by looking at the tolerance value and VIF (Variance Inflation Factor). The result shows 
that all the independent variables such as GW_Impair, Bsize, Lev, Cashflows and Size 
have tolerance level more than 0.1 and VIF below than 10. This result conclude that the 
data is free from multicollinearity. 
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4.4 Heteroscedasticity Tests 
The aim of this test is to test the identical of variance and residual from an 
observation. If it comes up with the identical result, it is called homoscedasticity and if 
the result shows that it is not identical, it called heteroscedasticity. A good regression 
model is a model which possesses the homoscedasticity. Glejser test is one of the test 
which can be used. Glejser test suggests to regress the absolute residual of independent 
variables (Gujarati, 2013). There is no heteroscedasticity test if the P-Value (Sig) > 
0.05. It is shown that the Sig. (P-Value) of all of the independent variables are 
exceeding 0.05. The result conclude that there is no heteroscedasticity. 
 
4.5 Autocorellation Test 
The purpose of autocorrelation test is to test whether there is correlation between 
one observable residual and another. A good regression model possesses no 
autocorrelation. This test is performed by Durbin-Watson test. Watson value has to be 
matched with the Durbin-Watson table. Along with n = 50 (the closest number of total 
sample 47), k‟ = 5 (number of regressor/independent variables), dU of research data is 
1.776 and 4-dU of research data is 2.224. The value of Durbin-Watson is 1.896 in which 
it lies between dU and 4-dU (1.776 < 1.896 < 2.224). So, the conclusion is the research 
data possess no autocorrelation. 
 
4.6 Hypothesis Testing 
The purpose of hypothesis testing is to measure the correlation between 
independent variable that affect the dependent variable. This test is also the main test to 
proof the hypothesis statement. The outcome of hypothesis testing partitioned into two 
parts, the first part is the outcome from the first regression, to search for DACC value. 
The purpose from the first regression is to seek the coefficient of each year NDACC 
(non-discretionary accruals). The NDACC coefficient is the key to input the NDACC 
coefficient to the DACC mathematical equation and compute it mathematically. The 
second part is the outcome from the second regression, to test the hypothesis. The 
outcome of hypothesis testing is listed below. 
Table 4.8 
Unstandardized Coefficient of Hypothesis Testing 
Variables Unstandardized 
Coefficients (β) 
Sig. 
C 2,200 0,000 
GW 2,101 0,010 
Bsize ,030 0,035 
Lev ,001 0,291 
Cashflows 1,229 0,000 
Size -,079 0,000 
F-statistics 122,075 
Prob (P-Value) 0,000 
Adjusted R
2
 0,929 
 
From Table 4.8 shows that the Adjusted R
2
 is 0.929. It shows that there is 
correlation between independent and dependent variables. The number 0.929 means that 
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the independent variables (GW, Lev, Bsize, Size, and Cashflow) can explain the 
dependent variable (DACC) for 92.9%. The 7.1% explained by the other variables. The 
result in Table 4.8 also test the goodness of fit of the regression model. The regression 
model is fit when the P-Value ≤ 0.05. From the result, the regression model is fit 
because P-Value is smaller than 0.05 (0.000 ≤ 0.05). Besides, it also means that GW, 
Bsize, Size, Cashflow and Lev are simultaneously affects GW. 
The result as it shown in Table 4.8, the constant positive value of 2.200 means that if 
all of the research variables‟ value are zero, the DACC (Discretionary acruals) will be 
increasing positively for 2.200. For GW, the result is aligned with the expectation that 
the goodwill impairment positively affects earnings management. It is proven by β1 > 0 
and P-Value (Sig) < 0.05 as the value of GW is 2.101 > 0 and 0.010 < 0.05. The 
regression result also shows that the effect of control variables are not aligned with the 
expectation and previous studies. Bsize has positive effect to DACC (β2 > 0 or 0.030) 
which tend to have opposite result with Alves (2013). Lev and Cashflow also have 
positive effect to DACC with the coefficient the value of 0.001 and 1.229 (β3,β4 > 0) 
respectively. Size has negative effect to DACC with β5 = -0.079. In addition, the P-value 
(Sig) of all of the control variables exluding Lev is less than 0.05, which mean that 
those control variables have significant effect to the DACC. It proves that those control 
variables which have significant effect are the variables which continuously affect the 
dependent variable, DACC. 
 
4.7 Discussion 
The result is aligned with the expectation that goodwill impairments positively 
affects earnings management measured using discretionary accruals as the main purpose 
of the research. As already been examined by Alves (2013) and Van de Poel et al. 
(2009), they suggest that companies use their discretion over goodwill impairment to 
manage earnings. This result suggests that PSAK 48 (Revision 2009) provides 
managers too much discretion for goodwill write-off. The main reason is even though 
an annual impairment test is mandatory, the actual recognition of a goodwill impairment 
is still subject to management„s discretion and very subjective. Goodwill impairment 
will affect the accruals, because they lower the reported earnings while they have no 
influence on the cash flows from operations. This result corroborates the idea that 
PSAK 48 (Revision 2009) involves managers‟ estimation of parameters, such as cash 
flow and discount rate, the subjective component in the determination of the amount of 
goodwill impairment loss to recognize may give rise to earnings management 
opportunities.  
 The control variables are mostly not aligned with the previous research. Bsize has 
positive relationship with DACC. This positive relationship between Bsize and earnings 
management suggesting that the higher the number of the board directors, the higher is 
the likelihood to use accruals to manage earnings. It suggests that the effectiveness of 
the monitoring and controlling mechanism performed by the board of commissioner is 
not affect by size only, it depends on others factor such as value, accepted norms and 
trust in an organization. The benefit of having a large board will be stuck at a point, 
which the benefits will be significantly drawn by the costs, such that it will no longer 
make economic sense to have a concentrated ownership structure. This issue of trust 
arise because the boards are often have the tendency to be friendly to management. As a 
result, they do not perform as expected in terms of their responsibilities in disciplining 
and monitoring the managers. This motivates the need to employ outsiders into the 
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board. Besides, a large board tends to be less effective, as decision-making becomes 
slower due to the involvement of more people. (Mak & Kusnadi, 2005)  
Leverage has positive relationship with earnings management means that an 
increase in leverage encourage managers to use more accruals to manage earnings; this 
action is done to avoid debt covenant violation. But it suggest no evidence that 
Leverage significantly affects the level of earnings management. Cashflow has positive 
effect means strong operating cash flows are morelikely to use discretionary accruals to 
engage in earnings management. Prior study claimed that the performance of the 
companies are closely related to the cash flow from operations and return on assets 
(ROA). So, reporting a good one might be an incentive for managers to manage 
earnings and signal future performance of the company (Demirkan and Platt, 2009). 
Besides, There is also an interpretation problem with the evidence that operating cash 
flows and accruals tend to be negatively related. We have to notice that if operating cash 
flows are unusually high (low), accruals will naturally be unusually low (high). Indeed, 
since our prior is that cash flows and nondiscretionary accruals should be negatively 
correlated, the different magnitude of these correlations could be interpreted as evidence 
of misclassification. (Bernard & Skinner, 1996) 
Size has negative relationship with earnings management explain large firm have a 
lower level of earnings management. According to Sarumpaet (2012), this matter is still 
debatable because larger firms are sensitive to critical monitoring, thus they are less 
likely to manage earnings. Small firms are able to keep their private information more 
successfully than larger companies, suggesting a reverse size effect (Lee and Choi in 
Sarumpaet 2002). 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
5.1 Conclusion 
This research studies about the association between goodwill impairment and 
earnings management. Based on the result, it suggests that goodwill impairment 
positively affects earnings management measured using discretionary accruals. This 
result prove the idea that PSAK 48 (Revision 2009) involves managers‟ estimation, 
such as cash flow and discount rate, the subjective component in the determination of 
the amount of goodwill impairment loss. This subjective recognition give opportunity 
for managers to manage their earnings.  
 
5.2 Limitation 
This research have limitations. The first is the limitation of the sample firms. In 
Indonesia, there are not many firms have goodwill impairment. This research supposed 
to cover all firms in Indonesia Stock Exchange but unfortunately there are only 47 firms 
which could pass the criteria. This is the consequence of the limited company which has 
goodwill in Indonesia. Besides, the research is using the old regulation which is PSAK 
48 (Revision 2009). The next limitation is that we only use four control variables which 
are leverage, board size, political cost, and operating cash flows.  
 
5.3 Suggestion 
For the better research, we provide some ideas for the following research regarding 
goodwill impairment and earnings management. There are some possibility that the next 
study could make, which are: 
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1. The next research may use the newest PSAK so the result could be use as 
current evaluation. 
2. The next research may add some control variables besides leverage, boardsize, 
political cost, and operating cash flows. 
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